Summary of Herman's Argument on Contemporary Kantianism - Argumentative Essay Example

Herman highly believes and support the notion as well as the argument that one acts morally when one chooses to act in a way in which that particular person would expect other people to act (in those circumstances). It means that an individual is viewed to legislate the moral law when one acts in such fashions. Herman believes that Kants critics should avoid the misinterpretation of the whole information especially when Kant mentions that the motive of duty need not reflect the interests the agent has in action but must, however, the importance that determines the actions of the agent. Herman supports the characterization of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as an objective, rationally necessary and the clear principle that must we always be embrace despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary.

Herman argues that an act has moral worth only if it is required by the duty and has its primary motive the motive of duty. This argument implies that other motives may be present but may not move the agent to act, because if they do, then whether the agent acts morally is just a matter of luck. In the article, Herman argues that what is required (for moral worth) is that whatever duty is in question we are not responsible for the non-moral motives present. However, they may not be what moves the agent to act. In this way, therefore, the motive of duty need to reflect the only interest the agent has in the action (or its effect). It is the interest that must, however, generate a determination of the agents acting as he did. As evident, this interpretation offers a plausible and textually sound answer to the question which Herman poses earlier in her article: "What is the matter with doing an action from a motive other than the motive of duty? As a response to this question, Herman asserts that the motive of duty gives one a direct interest that is aligned with the duty but doing so is merely a lucky accident.

Herman further mentions that the key to understanding Kants argument entails the idea that moral worth does not turn on the presence or absence of inclination supporting action. However, it is the integration in the agents maxim, which acts as the basis for a given activity. Herman believes that Kantian motives offer the reflection for his reasons for acting. It means that there is a possibility that an agent may take the presence of a desire to provide him with a reason to act. These reasons may be present in the agents passion, principles as well as the practical fascinations attached to the agent. Herman, therefore, believes that all these elements are in themselves are incentives and not the motive that leads to action. In this way, thus, it is only when an agent has a maxim that individuals can initiate his motivation.

Herman argues that an individual portraying sympathetic tempers responds to suffering and takes that response to provide him the substantial reasons to help. It is only at this point does he acts from the sympathy motive. According to Herman, any action done from the motive of duty is performed based on the fact that the doer finds it to be the right and appropriate thing to perform. In addition, the agent will perceive its righteousness and appropriateness as his reason for acting. In fact he acts from the motive of duty with a maxim that contain moral righteousness. In regard to this perception of the motives, Herman argues that it is possible for an agent to act from more than one motive in several different ways. For example, this could be that neither of the two incentives alone provides the agent with the sufficient reason to perform an action. In this sense, therefore, the agent will act on the combined motives. On the other hand, an agent may possess incentives which offers two distinct and sufficient reasons for an action. Until this point, Herman explicitly believes that there is no dutiful action from the two combined motive that could demonstrate moral worthiness. And based on the fact that an uncertain action has a moral duty because an agent usually believe that an action is morally worth as his reasons to do various actions. This leads to the destruction and a complete disappearance of the presence of a non-moral action.

Finally, on the account of moral worth, it still remains a matter of luck or accident that an action was morally performed by the agent. It means that the intensity of the competing factors and inclination, and the presence of circumstances that contributes to the competition may be influenced by chance. However, the effects of chance is on the person who is able to act in a moral and worthy way. The expression of the actions which are morally worth constitute to the relation of a motive action (through its maxim), despite the fact that lack may constitute to the moral worthiness of an action.

Arguments against Herman

A closer look at moral worth concept and for all its virtues and ingenuity, Hermans argument does not offer a substantial solution to the problem of mixed motives. Besides, these cases sidestep the issue entirely. Ideally, when one acts from the duty, it is no accident that the ultimate action is right because of ones intention, in that case, is usually to perform the right actions. Herman, therefore, think that in any case, the non-moral motives are inoperative and that they do not move the agent to act, then there it is impossible that they are likely to propel an individual to act against the duty. The notion of inoperative as used by Herman in her arguments makes it derail. Ideally, little harm may exist in speaking about the inoperative motives when an agent desires to perform a given action but fail to act in line with that particular desire. We can describe that situation that the agent possessed an inoperative motive that integrates the willingness the agent failed to perform or act on.

It is further undeniable that initiating a talk or the discussion of actions which are shown as (Herman does) subjects the whole argument into a court confusion. Mentioning that agent perhaps had two motives; Motive 1 and Motive 2 for doing a given action say X, and did X but only acted on the first one amounts to a substantial misuse of the term. On a broader note, it can be found that Hermans notion of an inoperative motive as merely demonstrating the manner in which moral worth can attach to actions that are motivated by both duty and sympathy. Notably, in any situation whereby sympathy is an inoperative motive, the agent does an action from single duty motive.

Herman further fails to offer the exposition of a proper interpretation of Kant regarding which beneficent actions have moral worth, especially when motivated solely by altruistic emotions like sympathy. The duty of beneficence is a virtue duty. It entails a duty to adopt a certain end, which in our case is the demonstration of happiness to other people. Herman does not, however, realise that Kant neither answers nor ask one crucial question, which involves the implication of adopting something as an end. Substantial emphasis should therefore be put in regard to the fact that virtues have duties which are best understood to shape and develop particular character traits. Therefore, it is undeniable to mention that the duty of beneficence is a vital duty that cultivates the virtue of benevolence. In the same way, the gratitude duty constitutes the duty of developing the name virtue, while the duty to oneself of moral perfection constitute the one which is morally right.

The presence of the non-moral inclination should not have any impacts on the actions moral worth when the motive is compelling and motivating. According to her, Herman believes that despite the fact that moral can express a given kind of interest that an agent has in the helpful action, it is a moral motive provided an agent acts on it. The audience might be highly skeptical regarding this reasoning, as they may substantially find numerous misinterpretation, ambiguity, and invalidity; taking original Kants arguments into consideration. As a matter of returning to the problem of moral worth, Kants critics have offered the argument that sympathy is the appropriate motive for certain acts of beneficence. Individuals will always benefit more from the actions done by the altruistic emotions compared to the one whereby duty motivates the benefitting individual. A closer look at Hermans position as observed in the above argument will reveal a significant ambiguity because even Kant himself seemed to hold a counterintuitive view that any act of beneficence possesses a moral worth in the event when it is motivated through duty and not by elements

Herman seems to puts more emphasis that in any case, an agent does not have the moral interest that is independently effective regarding a given action, there exists a dependence on non-moral interests that jeopardizes his ability to act morally. This argument is highly susceptible to numerous negative criticisms and skepticism. People may also struggle to understand this interpretations and assertions in regard to Hermans attempts to support Kants idea of the moral worthiness of an action. Ideally, conferring moral worth on actions required by perfect not motivated by duty but an empirical virtue is a move aimed at tearing the epicentre of Kants doctrine of moral value. It is based on the fact that if our understanding and reasoning go in line with that of Hermans then it going to be evident that no actions that must be performed from the duty to have a moral worth exists. Hermans point here sounds like a new doctrine, which may no longer reflect Kants ideas on the moral value.

Through her article, Herman would have provided the answer to the counterfactual question: How would an agent act in the event where sympathy and duty were conflicting? And if the sympathetic action was morally right? A critical inquiry to make in Hermans article and point is whether or not the sympathy alone motivate morally right actions. Generally, she does not address a more radical objection to Kants doctrine of moral worth, which integrate the notion that various empirical motives can through themselves constitute the moral value of actions.