Argumentative Essay Example: On the Value of Acting from the Moral of Duty vs. Kantian Theory on Moral Worth

Kant's Argument

Kantian Theory on Moral worth is one of the most discussed philosophical areas. Fundamentally, Kants theory of moral value involves the identification of the individuals as the author of the moral law. According to Kant, one acts morally when one chooses to act in a way in which that particular person would expect other people to act (in those circumstances). It means that an individual is viewed to legislate the moral law when one acts in such fashions. Kant mentions that the motive of duty need not reflect the interests the agent has in action but must, however, the importance that determines the actions of the agent. He went on and characterized the Categorical Imperative (CI) as an objective, rationally necessary and the clear principle that must we always embrace despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary.

Arguments against Herman's idea on Moral Worth

In the article, On the Value of Acting from the Moral of Duty, Barbara Herman offers a comprehensive proposition regarding the Kants argument on Categorical Imperative and its principles. In her view, an act has moral worth only if it is required by the duty and has its primary motive the motive of duty. This argument implies that other motives may be present but may not move the agent to act, because if they do, then whether the agent acts morally is just a matter of luck. In the article, Herman argues that what is required (for moral worth) is that whatever duty is in question we are not responsible for the non-moral motives present. However, they may not be what moves the agent to act. In this way, therefore, the motive of duty need to reflect the only interest the agent has in the action (or its effect). It is the interest that must, however, generate a determination of the agents acting as he did. As evident, this interpretation offers a plausible and textually sound answer to the question which Herman poses earlier in her article: "What is the matter with doing an action from a motive other than the motive of duty? As a response to this question, Herman asserts that the motive of duty gives one a direct interest that is aligned with the duty but doing so is merely a lucky accident.

In my view, and for all its virtues and ingenuity, Hermans argument does not offer a substantial solution to the problem of mixed motives. Besides, these cases sidestep the issue entirely. Ideally, when one acts from the duty, it is no accident that the ultimate action is right because of ones intention, in that case, is usually to perform the right actions. Herman, therefore, think that in any case, the non-moral motives are inoperative and that they do not move the agent to act, then there it is impossible that they are likely to propel an individual to act against the duty. The notion of inoperative as used by Herman in her arguments makes it derail. Ideally, little harm may exist in speaking about the inoperative motives when an agent desires to perform a given action but fail to act in line with that particular desire. In my view, we can describe that situation that the agent possessed an inoperative motive that integrates the willingness the agent failed to perform or act on.

I am also made to think that initiating a talk or the discussion of actions which are shown as (Herman does) subjects the whole argument into a court confusion. Mentioning that agent perhaps had two motives; Motive 1 and Motive 2 for doing a given action say X, and did X but only acted on the first one amounts to a substantial misuse of the term. On a broader note, I find Hermans notion of an inoperative motive as merely demonstrating the manner in which moral worth can attach to actions that are motivated by both duty and sympathy. I believe that in any situation whereby sympathy is an inoperative motive, the agent does an action from single duty motive.

In another argument, Herman mentions that the key to understanding Kants argument entails the idea that moral worth does not turn on the presence or absence of inclination supporting action. However, it is the integration in the agents maxim, which acts as the basis for a given activity. Herman believes that Kantian motives offer the reflection for his reasons for acting. It means that there is a possibility that an agent may take the presence of a desire to provide him with a reason to act. These reasons may be present in the agents passion, principles as well as the practical fascinations attached to the agent. Herman, therefore, believes that all these elements are in themselves are incentives and not the motive that leads to action. In this way, thus, it is only when an agent has a maxim that individuals can initiate his motivation. A critical inquiry to make at this point is whether or not the sympathy alone motivate morally right actions. In my view, Herman does not address a more radical objection to Kants doctrine of Moral worth, which integrate the notion that various empirical motives can through themselves constitute the moral value of actions.

Herman further fails to offer the exposition of a proper interpretation of Kant regarding which beneficent actions have moral worth, especially when motivated solely by altruistic emotions like sympathy. In my opinion, the duty of beneficence is a virtue duty. It entails a duty to adopt a certain end, which in our case is the demonstration of happiness to other people. Herman does not, however, realise that Kant neither answers nor ask one crucial question, which involves the implication of adopting something as an end. I will still emphasize that virtues have duties which are best understood to shape and develop particular character traits. Therefore, it is undeniable to mention that the duty of beneficence is a vital duty that cultivates the virtue of benevolence. In the same way, the gratitude duty constitutes the duty of developing the name virtue while the duty to oneself of moral perfection constitute the one which is morally right.

The presence of the non-moral inclination should not have any impacts on the actions moral worth when the motive is compelling and motivating. According to her, Herman believes that despite the fact that moral can express a given kind of interest that an agent has in the helpful action, it is a moral motive provided an agent acts on it. I am highly skeptical regarding this reasoning, as I find numerous misinterpretation, ambiguity, and invalidity; taking original Kants arguments into consideration. As a matter of returning to the problem of moral worth, Kants critics have offered the argument that sympathy is the appropriate motive for certain acts of beneficence. Individuals will always benefit more from the actions done by the altruistic emotions compared to the one whereby duty motivates the benefitting individual. A closer look at Hermans position as observed in the above argument will reveal a significant ambiguity because even Kant himself seemed to hold a counterintuitive view that any act of beneficence possesses a moral worth in the event when it is motivated through duty and not by elements such as sympathy.

Finally, Herman puts more emphasis that in any case, an agent does not have the moral interest that is independently effective regarding a given action, there exists a dependence on non-moral interests that jeopardizes his ability to act morally. I portray strong skepticism in line with this argument and struggle to understand this interpretations and assertions in regard her attempts to support Kants idea of the moral worthiness of an action. I feel that conferring moral worth on actions required by perfect not motivated by duty but an empirical virtue is a move aimed at tearing the epicenter of Kants doctrine of moral value. It is based on the fact that if our understanding and reasoning go in line with that of Hermans then it going to be evident that no actions that must be performed from the duty to have a moral worth exists. Hermans point here sounds like a new doctrine, which may no longer reflect Kants ideas on the moral value.

A substantial difficulty is therefore portrayed here, and Hermans idea destroys Kants notion. It therefore towards a crucial conclusion that the center of Kants doctrine on Moral Worth is not expressed by the actual motives of the agents. I believe that through her article, Herman would have been to provide the answer to the counterfactual question: How would an agent act in the event where sympathy and duty were conflicting? And if the sympathetic action was morally right?

Conclusion

In conclusion, Kants doctrine of moral worth leads us to darkness. In my view, there is no valid reason to choose and relate particular merit to various actions which are motivated by duty. Multiple concerns addressed by Kant that the moral worthiness is not accidental (as Herman thinks) is sufficiently met by requiring a moral law to serve as limiting conditions. In this way, therefore, it is an individuals character traits that determine the moral worthiness of action, and whether it is accidental or not. Additionally, the issues of whether or not an action was motivated by duty (as observed in Hermans argument) is only of a tangential interest. As a Kantian, she should entirely cease to care about the moral worthiness of an action. Hermans emphasis here seems to side on action instead of the individual, who is a general structure of the agents character as described by virtue.