Article Review Example: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty

Herman profoundly believes and supports the argument that a person acts morally when they choose to react in a way in which they would expect other people to act under in similar circumstances (633). It means that an individual is viewed to legislate the moral law when he acts within his motives. Herman believes that Kants critics should avoid the misinterpretation of the whole information; this especially when Kant mentions that the purpose of duty need not reflect the interests the agent has in action, but must, however, consider the importance that determines the actions of the agent (634). Herman supports the characterization of the

Categorical Imperative (CI) as an objective, rationally necessary and clear principle that must always be embraced, despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary (pp.633).

Herman argues that an act has moral worth only if it is required by the duty and has its primary motive, which is the motive of responsibility (pp. 633). This argument implies that other motives may be present, but may not move the agent to act, because if they do, then whether the agents act morally is just a matter of luck. In the chapter, Herman argues that what is required for moral worth is that whatever duty is in question; we are not responsible for the non-moral motives present (pp. 635). However, they may not be what moved the agent to act. Therefore, in this way, the purpose of duty needs to reflect the only interest the agent has in the action (or its effect). However, the interest must generate a determination of the agents actions as they did.

Herman argues that the motive of duty gives one a direct interest that is aligned with the duty but doing so is merely a lucky accident (Herman, 1981, p.638).

Further, Herman mentions that the key to understanding Kants argument entails the idea that moral worth does not turn on the presence or absence of inclination supporting action (Herman, 1981, p.639). However, it is the integration in the agents maxim, which acts as the bias for a given activity. Herman believes that Kantian motives offer the reflection for his reason for acting (Herman, 1981, p.368). It means that there is a possibility that an agent may take the presence of a desire to provide him with a reason to act. These causes may be present in the agents passion, as well as the practical fascinations attached to the agent. Herman, therefore, believes that all these elements in themselves are incentives and not the motive that leads to action. Thus in this way, it is when an agent has a maxim that individuals can initiate his motivation (Herman, 1981, p.638).

Herman argues that an individual portraying sympathetic tempers responds to suffering and takes that responsibility to provide him the substantial reasons to help (Herman, 1981, p.639). It is only at this point; he acts from the sympathy motive. According to Herman, any action done for duty is performed because the doer finds it to be the correct and appropriate thing to execute (Herman, 1981, p. 362). In addition, the agent will perceive its rightness and appropriateness as his reason for acting. In fact, he acts from the motive of duty with a maxim that contains moral rightness. Concerning this perception of the motives, Herman argues that it is possible for an agent to act for more than one reason in several different ways (Herman, 1981, p.639). For example, this could be that neither of the two incentives alone provides the agent with the sufficient reason to act. In this sense, therefore, the agents will act on the combined motives. Alternatively, an agent may possess incentives, which offer two distinct and sufficient reasons for an action. Until this point, Herman explicitly believes the lack of a dutiful deed from the two combined motives that could demonstrate moral worthiness (Herman, 10981, p.369). Moreover, since an uncertain action has a moral duty because an agent usually believes that an action is morally worthy as his reasons to do various activities.

On account of moral worth, it remains a matter of luck or accidents that the agent morally acted. It means that the intensity of the competing factors and inclination and the presence of circumstances that contribute to the competition may be influenced by chance. However, the effect of luck is on the person who can act in a morally and worthily. The expression of the actions, which are morally worth, constitutes to the relation of a motive action (through its maxim), despite the fact that lack may constitute to the moral worthless of an action (Herman, 1981, p. 364). In this case, Herman believes that if an agent lacks an independently effective and motivating moral interest in an action. Even after acting as required by the duty, then a reliance on the non-moral benefits remains that compromise his ability to act morally (Herman, 1981, p.644). It means that a person need not be indifferent to the possible satisfaction that can be generated by the dutiful actions. However, the existence of such possibilities should never be the ground of an agents commitment to acting morally. In her view,

Herman believes that actions that are over-determined have the moral worthiness if such a noble motive is the grounds determiner of an action (or the motive on which an agent acts) (Herman, 1981, p.637). In this sense, therefore, human beings have interest in many things, including morality. Thus, a person will be described as morally fit when he acts from an effective and primary moral motive. The extent of this fitness integrates more than the presence of a moral motive that is adequate to generate an action, which is perceived as dutiful. A substantial importance is attached to this argument because it fulfills all the points put forward by Kant.

While it is evident that Herman has attempted to provide her support and stand on the contemporary Kantianism, her arguments are not convincing. A closer look at the moral worth concept, its virtues and ingenuity indicate that Hermans argument does not offer a substantial solution to the problem of mixed motives. Besides, her arguments sidestep the issue entirely.

Ideally, when one acts from the duty, it is no accident that the ultimate action is correct because of ones intention to perform the right actions. Herman, therefore, thinks that in any case, the nonmoral motives are inoperative and that they do not move the agents to act, then is impossible for them to propel an individual to react against the duty (Herman, 1981, p.641). The notion of inoperative as used by

Herman in her arguments makes it derail. Ideally, little harm may exist in speaking about the inoperative motives when an agent desires to perform a given action but fail to act in line with that particular desire.

It is further undeniable that initiating the discussion of actions as Herman does subject the whole argument into a court confusion. Mentioning that agent perhaps had two motives; Motive 1 and Motive 2 for doing a given action say X and did X, but only acted on the first one amounts to a substantial misuse of the term. On a broader note, it can be found that Hermans notion of an inoperative motive merely demonstrates the manner in which moral worth can attach to actions that are motivated by both duty and sympathy. Notably, in any situation whereby compassion is an inoperative motive, the agent does an action from single duty motive.

Herman further fails to offer the exposition of a proper interpretation of Kant regarding which beneficent actions have moral worth, especially when motivated solely by altruistic emotions such as sympathy (Herman, 1981, p. 642). The duty of beneficence is a virtue duty. It entails a commitment to adopt a particular end, which in our case is the demonstration of happiness to the other people. However, Herman does not, realize that Kant neither answers nor asks one crucial question, which involves the implication of adopting something as an end. Substantial emphasis should, therefore, be provided concerning the fact that virtues have duties, which are best understood to shape and develop particular character traits. Thus, it is undeniable to mention that the duty of beneficence is a vital duty that cultivates the dirt of benevolence. In the same way, the gratitude duty constitutes the duty of developing the name virtue, while the duty to oneself of moral perfection constitutes the one, which is morally right.

The presence of the non-moral inclination should not have any impacts on the actions moral worth when the motive is compelling and motivating (Herman, 1981, P. 363). According to her, Herman believes that despite the fact that moral worth can express a given kind of interest that an agent has in the helpful action, it is a noble motive provided an agent acts on it (Herman, 1981, p.635). The audience might be highly skeptical regarding this reasoning, as they may substantially find numerous misinterpretations, ambiguities, and invalidities, considering Kants original arguments. As a matter of returning to the problem of moral worth, Kants critics have offered the evidence that sympathy is the appropriate motive for particular acts of beneficence. Individuals will always benefit more from the actions done by the altruistic emotions compared to the one whereby duty motivates the benefiting individual. A closer look at Hermans position as observed in the above argument will reveal a significant ambiguity because even Kant, himself, seemed to hold a counterintuitive view that any act of beneficence possesses a moral worth in the event when it is motivated through duty and not by elements.

Herman seems to put more emphasis that in any case, an agent does not have the moral interest that is independently effective regarding a given action. She further argues about the existence of dependence on non-moral interests that jeopardize his ability to act morally (Herman, 1981, p.644). This argument is highly susceptible to numerous negative criticisms and skepticism. People may also struggle to understand this interpretation and assertion concerning Hermans attempts to support Kants idea of the moral worthiness of an action. Ideally, conferring moral worth on actions required by perfect no motivated by duty, but an empirical virtue is a move aimed at tearing the epicenter of Kants doctrine of moral value. It is based on the fact that if our understanding and reasoning go in line with that of Hermans then its going to be evident that no actions that must be performed from the duty to have a moral worth exists. Hermans point here appears to be a new doctrine, which may no longer reflect Kants original ideas on the moral value.

Rather than offering an argument attempting to support Kants contemporary Kantianism,

Herman would have provided the answer to the different question: How would an agent act in the event where sympathy and duty were conflicting? And, if the sympathy action was morally right? A critical inquiry to make in Hermans article and point is whether the sympathy alone motivates ethically right actions or not. She does not address a more fundamental objection to Kants doctrine of moral worth, which integrates the notion that various empirical motives can constitute the moral value of actions through themselves.

References

Herman, B. (1981). On the value of acting from the motive of duty. The Philosophical Review, 90(3), 633-647.